Can anyone please help me with this passage from J. J. C. Smart's article "Sensations and brain Processes"?

I have a problem understanding a passage from an article which I am reading and I would be very thankful if somebody could help me understand it. Yes, it is homework - more specifically for a course in philosophy of mind. So hereit is: "Now how do I get over the objection that a sensation can be identified with a brain process only if it has some phenomenal property, not possessed by brain processes, whereby one-half of the identification may be, so to speak, pinned down?" Here is a link to Smart's article, in case you want it in context: http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/facult... (On the 4th page at the bottom)





I found something about the passage (http://www.stanford.edu/~lmaguire/phil18... look under 'Objection 3'), but I am not sure if that is the right interpretation, especially because then I don't see how Smart's 'topic neutral' account of sensation statements actually counters this objection.





I would really appreciate any pointers!

Can anyone please help me with this passage from J. J. C. Smart's article "Sensations and brain Processes"?
Wow, this is a toughie - very deep stuff. I think the gist of the argument is that one side believes that sensations are distinct from brain processes, and have something unique about them - something observable (phenomenal) - that brain processes don't. For example - a sensation might be hearing a clap of thunder, whereas a pure brain process might be thinking about a clap of thunder. The other side of the debate argues that sensations are not distinguishable from brain processes, because our brains first "process" the phenomemom (the thunder calp in this case) then assign meaning to it. And because 2 people may assign different meanings to the same clap of thunder - one may hear it, and the other may be so busy that they don't - there is no distinction between the sensation and the brain process. It's basically an ontological argument about what is real, and what is not, reminiscent of Plato's arguments that nothing in this world is real, it is merely as we perceive it (which would be the second argument), and Aristotle's view that the material world is real (the first argument, that sensations are independent of our brain processes). At least, that's what I get out of it. Hope this helps.
Reply:Honestly it makes not a whole lot of sense to me either.





It sounds like people are objecting by saying unless it has some outside stimulus (phenomenal property) it can';t be identified as a brain process.





This sounds totally backwards to me, all kinds of brain processes require no real outside stimulus at that moment, such as dreams.